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THE STRUCTURES AND THE ROLE OF AN INTERNATIONAL AGENCY
FOR THE CONTROL OF SATELLITES
JURIDICAL ASPECTS
R. J. Dupuy i
In his speech of May 25, 1978 before the General Assembly of 	 /333*
the United Nations meetin g in special session to study problems o
disarmament, the President of France declared: "If disarmament is
to become- the bu,,iness of all, it must be carried out with the agree-
ment of all, under the control of all and for the benefit of all".(1)
1
And Va:ery Giscard d'Estaing proposed various measures for attaining
these goals. The proposal to create an international agency for t'ie
control of satellites was intended to ensure the control of all, the
control of disarmament or arms limitation agreement, , by using obser-
vation satellites.	 f
The proposal pointed out that only two powers were presently
I
in a position to undertake such control by reconnaissanc- satellite,
,
the United States and the USSR. But the development of space capaci-
ties by certain other powers allows us to believe that in a few years
they too would be ready to gather useful data which % .,ould be avai-la-
ble to the international conmunity to help establish a lasting peace
through arms control. The multiplicity of international means, by
	 {
changing international relations, c;)uld be a factor in, the reduction
of tensions through the diffusion of information on the power and
military movements of the various member states.
Nevertheless, many juridical problems appear upon careful study
of this plan. Certain ones arise in regard to the creation of the
Agency, questioning its viability, its ability to bring tog p t',er the
(1) Le Monde, May 27, 1978, p. 6. 	 I
* Numbers in the margin indicate pagination in the foreign text.
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conditions indispensable to its formation and its development; other /334
problems are connected with the operation of the Agency, its powers,
its functioning, its methods of acting on the collected data, and its
credibility.
The Viabilitv of the AQenc,
The birth of the Agency presupposes:
adherence of the member states and their wi .'est possible parti-
cipation;
the brinqing together of technological means - data, receiver
and treatment stations, satellites - which would constitute the
contribution in kind of certain participants in this undertaking;
regular financing;
status within the United Nations :system.
%Jherence of the Member States
In the name of the absolute sovereignty of the member sta es,
it is necessary to deal with to opposite types of behavior:
- the two great space powers possessing the means to observe
the entire surface of the earth do not yet see it as being in their
interest to participate in this plan since they have access to all
of the collectable data without being required to communicate it. It
must be pointed out `hat no member state has yet declared to them that
this permanent observation violates their sovereignty inasmuch, per-
haps, a: the data gathered are not disseminated.
- the other countries for the most part will certainly be ready
to join such an Agency in the hope of being a position to obtain in-
formation on their neighbors which may be useful to their security,
while possibly opposing, in the name of sovereignty and security,
the diffusion of date concerning their own territories.
In this regard it is necessary to refer to the current discussion
- 4 -
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in the Committee for Peaceful Uses of Outer Space a propos the tele-
observation of the earth; many member states are opposed to the free
dissemination of data in the name of sovereignty over natural resour-
ces. This difficult question will be dealt witi. it the second part
of this study.
The Technical Means that woul d be Available to the A c,enc
Taking into account the high cost of space technology, the
plan foresees a progressive development of the technical means of the
Agency.
	
Three stages are envisaged (2):	 /335
1. The Agency has only one c-nter for the treatment and interpre-
tation of data supplied by the satellites of the countries that have
a surveillance system, i.e., the United States and the USSR, during
the first stage, perhaps France or Europe afterwards.
Alth.'ugh the plan intends to avoid what is known as "the level
of ultimate employment of national means" as well as "technical in-
formation considered to be sensitive", one does not see reasons that
will convince the present space pwers to communicate to the interna-
tional community information that confers on them an undeniable pri-
macy - at least inasmuch as it may be a question of sounding out allies
on a matter that concerns them, and in order then perhaps to dissemi-
nate information on the territory of other member nations, which may
have acquired the right to object precisely because of membership in
the Agency.
2. A second stage provides for the possibility of direct access to
national satellites. Various options are possible: a well-deployed
closed network suitable for gathering data from many types of satell-
ites, or recourse to national stations of the Landsat type (intended
(2) Cf Documr-rt SMA/WP/3 of June 11, 1979, submitted by the French
expert to the group of government experts installed according to
Resolution 33/71 J of December 14, 1978 of the General Assembly of
the United Nations, p. 26 ff.
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for teleobservation of terrestrial resources) in (-.)raor to obtain data
adjusted to the level of performance which the member nations have
agreed to make available to the Agency, or data r eceived from a single
space system (the futre French SPOT system for example) with coverage
by Landsat or by well-deployed special stations.
This second stage already presupposes an investment of a varia-
ble but not negligible amount, as well as the agreement of the member
states that progressively acquire space capacity.
3.	 The third stage consists of providing the Agency with observa-
tion satellites in order to carry out its data-gathering program
without interference and to avoid the risks involved in handling the
data, so as to better adapt the means to the intended missions.
All of this presupposes a large amount of funding in order to
create the installations and maintain them.
Funding the Agent
The promoters of the project have attempted cost estimates.
The latter can only be indicative, as they point out, due to the
many possible hypotheses on the reactions of the member nations to
the Agency plan. There is a wide margin with many scenarios between
that of total collaboration of all memberstates with space capacity
when and as required by the development of the Agency (a Yelatively
low-cost but utopian hypothesis) and that of refusal of collaboration
by all of the member states who are in possession of satellites and
stations (which can be ruled out). The French estimates (3) have been
criticized already (4).
(3) Op. cit, p. 32 ff.
(4) Document SMA/WP/4 of September 10, 1979, p. 8 ff. Remarks received
from Mr. Santhanam, expert from India.
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There are three possiLle types of funding:
voluntary payments, "contributions in kind", that is to say, the
technological means placed at the disposal of the Agency by cer-
tain countries: satellites and stations;
contributions according to the budgetary regulations of the
organs of the United Nations system;
remuneration for services rendered by the Agency; payments made
by member states who have applied to the Agency to ensure the
control of disarmament agreements between them, according to
conditions remaining to be specified in the Agency's charter.
These means of funding presuppose the adherence of space powers,
or lacking that, a very large financial contribution by the less pow-
erful countries. And it is necessary to point out that consideration
must be given to a system of weighting the votes in relation to finan-
cial participation; otherwise the decisions might be made by those
who do not contribute funding and therefore not be able to be applied.
It
The Status of the Agency
The French proposal suogests that the Agency be included in
the United Nations sy-te,ii in the form of a specialized institution.
Although other possibilities are conceivable: a technical organ
directly attached to the General Assembly or to the Security Council,
or dependent upon the United Nations Disarmament Commission, or
put into action by the Secretary General on the request of a party 	 /337
to a disarmament agreement - the form of specialized institution has
many advantages and seems adapted to the task at hand. The principal
aspects of its status are described thus (5):
- "the Agency acts according to the purposes and principles of
the United Nations Charter, in accordance with the policy of the
United Nations regarding disarmament...";
- "the .?gency is entrusted with gathering, treating and supply-




(5) Document SMA/WP/3, p. 39 ff.
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satellites". This point will be specified and discussed in the
second part of this study, when we examine the Agency's powers;
- the Agency must respect the sovereign rights of the member
nations;
- any member of the United Nations or of a spcialized institu-
tion may belong;
- the instances of decision and deliberation must include a
full body, the General Assembly of the members, and a limited body,
the space powers and the countries concerned with disarmament, with
balanced regional representation;
-	 the status of the personnel of the Agency and the control
of its activities must be specially studied so as to take into account
the "sensitive" nature of the data in order to ensure in concrete
terms respect for the limits set to the control by the Agency's
charter and the secrecy of the information gathered within the frame-
work of its mandate. Here too, there is the problem of dissemination
of data.
The framework of a specialized institution seems perfectly ac-
ceptable, especially inasmuch as it guarantees the Agency's autoncmy.
The Credibility of the Agency
In order for the Agency to function normally so that it may be
in a conditions to play its role to the benefit of the international
community as a whole "for the benefit of all", it must have credibi-
lity, its regulations must be precise and realistic, its ambitions
must perhaps be limited but its capacities must be accepted without
reserve by the majority of the countries.
Several problems arise:
the scope of the Agency's powers;
the Agency's modes of intervention;
the dissemination of the collected data;
- 8 -
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the value of the data ^,nd the means of evaluating, using, and
confirming it.
The Agency's Powers
The Agency is expected to participate in the contrc'_ of the
implementation of disarmament and security agreements on the one
hand and to participate in inquiries into specific crisis situations
on the other hand. It "provides a collection of technological means
and abilities" (6).
	 It gives advice first of all on the effective-
ness of observation by satellite for a planned mission for which if
positive it proceeds to gather data, treat it, and finally supply
an interpretive report that is limited to stating the facts that might
be deduced from the observation.
It must not go beyond this stage; in particular, it must not
evaluate these facts in a political context, not to mention make




technical role; the evaluation of a violation of an agreement and
the making of sanctions must be left to other organs of the United
Nations.
The Ag ency 's Modes of Intervention
To avoid conferring on the Agency a task of total and permanent
observation that would tend to establish a sort of global surveillance
organ (6), it is necessary to provide very precisely for the mechanisms
for putting the Agency's controls into play.
It would intervene in two cases:
- upon the request of the member states who are parties to
disarmament and security agreement .
 For existing accords that pro-
vide for control the Agency then offers new technological means
Hl" -,






comparable to the national means, the procedure for implementation
being specified in common by the Agency and the parties to the accord.
For future accords recourse to the Agency can be expressly provided
for, which will have available standard agreements that it could
propose to zhe interested member states.
-	 upon the request of an interested member state or possibly
the Security Council, in application of Article 34 of the United
Nations Charter, which confers on it the right to inquire into any
difference or situation liable to result in a discord, in order to 	 /339
investigate a particular situation and calm a crisis situation.
The plan provides for the Agency to have, for its effectiveness,
a bank of data on the areas possibly to be controled, before the
crisis or upon the request for control, for comparison. This bank
of data would be acquired by observation of the territories of all
of the member nations participating, from the time they join, their
consent to the observation being given when they join. This bank
would consist of data whose use would not put into play the vital
interest of the membernations. It nevertheless poses the problem
of dissemination of the data.
The Dissemination of Data
i
The data gathered are raw data: it is forbidden to disseminate
it as such, most of the member states not being in a position to
E	 interpret it due to lack of the technical knowledge, which would
i	 place them in an unequal situation. The Agency must therefore plan
to "supply a factual report consisting of a translation in clear
language of the data coming from the satellites... as the case may be:
volume and development of military movements, the nature of the
equipment involved, maintenance of the demilitarization of a zone,
etc..."(7).
111,
The most serious problem is: Who is going to benefit from the R
(7) Op. cit. p. 38.
i
rJ
Agency's reports? There are tw(, possibilities:
dissemination limited solely to the interested parties (mem-
ber states party to the accord or difference, Security Council for
cases of developing,crises);
dissemination to all of the member states belonging to the
Agency.
This problem is a very exact reflection of the pro'alem posed
to the Committee fo g Peaceful Uses of Outer Space of the United
Nations, in regard to the teleobservation of the earth and of the
information on the economic resources of the countries on which in-
formation can be gathered and disseminated. The former stake is
military; the latter is economic. A reconciliation has been made,
especially by the representatives of India (8) and of Belgium (9)
to this Committee elsewhere.	 Two opinions clash: the eastern 	 /340
block countries (10) and a certain number of Third World countries
are of the opinion that it is necessary to limit dissemination in
order to respect sovereignty over natural resources in particular;
certain western countries such as the United States, the Low Coun-
tries, Great Britain, Italy and Sweden are of the opinion that it
is necessary to disseminate the gathered information as widely as
possible and that its dissemination has never harmed anyone and
that, on the contrary, this is the way to "prevent a growing inequali-
ty among the member nations not having the same economic and techni-
cal development... any limitation in the dissemination of such data
would only have the effect of accentuating the growing predominance
of the member state who are possessors" (11)..
Can one extrapolate from the economic to the military? Probably
not. It is necessary, however, not to lose sight of the fact that
the two space powers make overflights of the entire earth and accumu-
late data for their own use alone, doing this for a number of years
(f) United Nations r:.c:ument A/AC. 105/PV 192, p. 8.
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without anyone having raised the question of violation of sovereignty.
Would sovereignty be more violated if the same data were stored in
the archives of a specialized institution and disseminated on demand
to any party who could prove legitimate interest in it for the put-
poses of secur 4 ty and peace? Even without the agreement of the ob-
served country'
The problem of the secrecy of the accumulated files also in-
volves the question of the status of the personnel c,f the Agency and
of the ccntrol of their discretion.
The Value and Use of the Data
The authors of the plan point out the value that must accorded
to the data collected by satellite: "Often, rather than proof,
observation satellites, that cannot see everywil ,ere and at all times,
are capable only of supplying evidence, permitting, es the case may
be, the start of a more complete investigation" (12). 	 The data are /341
therefore far from constituting proofs; they can be considered as
presumptions only, and that in 	 double sense.
First of all, the raw data, after pre-treatment (elimination
of parasites, re-constitution of photographs...) are treated or
interpreted in order to arrive at facts: volume and development of
military equipment... Now. the technicians recognize that the[e can
be several possible-interpretations of the same data, even very
highly developed satellites still having limits.
Then, when an interpreation has been accepted, it only states
facts that need to be corroborated by what the specialists call
(10) A convention on the teleobservat ion of thF earth was signed in
Moscow on May 19, 1978 by th USSR, Bulgaria, Cuba, Flungary, Mongolia,
Poland, East Germany, Romania, Czechs! ,,vakia, which provides for
(Art. IV and V) the "explicit consent of the contractinq party to
whom the observed territory and natural resources b6long" for the
dissemination of the basic data and information obtained by decoding.
United Nations Document A/33/162 of June 29, 1978.
(11) United Nations Document A/AC. 105/PV 193, p. 24.
	 Interven~ion of
the representative of Sweden.
(12) Doc. SMA/WP/3, preface.
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"terrain verity": control at the site or by other means that con=
firm or disprove the facts, and explain them.
It seems that this stage must be entrusted to another organ,
of a political and not a technical nature, having the rower to
make decisions on an
-
investigation ?nd make possible sanctions: The
Security council seems, at first glance, to be qualified for this task.
In conclusion, if the security of all is an ideal co be sought
after, the agreement of all does not seem to have been acquired for
the creation of an agency that would ensure control of armaments for i
all to the benefit of all.
Now, it is the adherence of the most powerful that has some
chance of making the undertaking viable, by providing ?.t with the
real means for its functioning. And this adherence will perhaps
depend on the level of dissemination available to the least powerful
for the information that they will be able to gather for themselves.
If the quartit •I of "classified" information dimiiishe-, the tension
that attempts o pierce secrecy entail would diminish. If the
quantity of "classified" information increases because a greater
number of large countries can accumulate it while at the same time
limiting its disse^ination, the ris', of tension increases.
1
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